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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This appeal arises from a simple debt collection action by which plaintiff/respondent 
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. ("Citibank") seeks to recover the amount owing on 
defendant/appellant Miriam Carroll's ("Carroll") Citibank credit card account (the "Account"). 
The district court, the Honorable John H. Bradbury presiding (the "District Court"), granted 
summary judgment in Citibank's favor, ruling that Carroll is indebted to Citibank for the amount 
owed on the Account. R Vol. I, pp. 186-194. On April 3, 2008, the District Court entered 
judgment against Carroll, awarding Citibank a total judgment of$90,304.I0, which includes the 
principal and interest due on the Account, plus an award of attorney's fees and costs (the 
"Judgment"). R see Augmented Record. 
In the District Court proceedings, Carroll did not dispute the evidence submitted by 
Citibank in support of summary judgment, which established that she incurred a debt on her 
credit card Account and failed to pay for that obligation. The evidence in support of summary 
judgment included Carroll's responses to discovery, as well as the affidavit of a custodian of 
records, the credit card agreement governing the Account (the "Card Agreement") and the 
monthly billing statements for the Account (the "Account Statements"). RVol. 3, pp. 515-629. 
Among other things, Carroll challenged summary judgment on the grounds that Citibank 
supposedly did not have standing with respect to the Account because Citibank transferred its 
receivables relating to its credit card accounts as part of a process known as asset securitization. 
After extensive briefing from both parties and oral argument, the District Court denied Carroll's 
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arguments and granted summary judgment, ruling that, based on the undisputed facts, Citibank 
did have standing because the evidence confirmed that Citibank did not sell the Account: 
Nothing in the evidence suggests that Citibank transferred to the 
Master Trust anything more than the receivables on Ms. Carroll's 
account .... The receivables are separate from the account, and one 
can be transferred without the other. The record reflects that 
Ms. Carroll's account was retained by Citibank. As owner of 
the account, Citibank has standing to collect the debt owed on 
the account. 
R Vol. 1, pp. 189, 193-94 (emphasis added). 1 
On appeal, Carroll challenges only that portion of the District Court's decision regarding 
Citibank's standing as the real party in interest with respect to the Account. Opening Brief, 
pp. 3-4. Carroll does not challenge the District Court's ruling that Carroll is liable for the debt 
owed on the Account, that Citibank is exempt from the licensing requirements of the Idaho 
Collection Agencies Act ("ICAA"), or that Citibank is entitled to attorney's fees in this action 
pursuant to the terms of the credit card agreement governing Carroll's Account and Idaho Code 
§ 12-120 and Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
B. Course Of Proceedings. 
On June 15, 2006, Citibank filed the operative Amended Complaint. R Vol. 1, pp. 20-22. 
On August 15, 2006, Carroll filed an Amended Answer to Complaint with Counterclaims. Id., 
The District Court also held that Citibank is exempt from the licensing requirements of the 
Idaho Collection Agencies Act pursuant to Idaho Code § 26-2239 because Citibank is a 
regulated lender. Id., pp. 190, 194. 
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pp. 23-31. Following discovery, on January 19, 2007, Citibank filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, with supporting affidavits and evidence. R Vol. 3, pp. 515-684. 
Subsequently, the District Court permitted additional briefing and discovery on the 
limited issue of standing. R Vol. 1, pp. 71-72. On November 1, 2007, and following a hearing 
on the standing issue, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order (the 
"Order"), granting the Summary Judgment Motion. R Vol. 1, pp. 186-194. On December 24, 
2007, Carroll filed a Motion for Reconsideration and other documents challenging the Order 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 195-208); after Citibank filed its response, the District Court heard oral argument 
on January 24, 2008, on the Motion for Reconsideration. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 44-53. After hearing 
argument from both parties, the District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and 
granted Citibank's Motion for Entry of Judgment and Fees. R Vol. 1, pp. 229, 233-34. The 
Judgment was entered on April 3, 2008, awarding Citibank a total of $90,304.10, which 
includes: (i) $24,567.91, as the principal balance due on the Account plus $16,244.79 in accrued 
interest from October 6, 2005 to December 20, 2007, plus accruing interest from December 20, 
2007, at the per diem rate of$20.18, to April 3, 2008 (the date of the Judgment); and 
(ii) $49,491.29 for attorney's fees and costs. R see Augmented Record. 
Carroll filed a Notice of Appeal on March 7, 2008. R Vol. 1, pp. 236-41. 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
1. Carroll's Account. 
Carroll applied for her Account on or about February 16, 1999. R Vol. 3, p. 574 
(Affidavit of Terri Ryning ("Ryning Aff."), 112). The terms and conditions of the Account are 
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governed by the Card Agreement, which was provided to Carroll at or about the time she opened 
the Account. R Vol. 3, p. 574 (Ryning Aff. ~ 2), Ex. 4 (Card Agreement). Carroll began using 
her Account in approximately December 1999. Id. Citibank has been the owner of the Account 
since the inception of the Account, and still is the owner of the Account. R Vol. 3, p. 576 
(Ryning Aff. ~ 8). There is no dispute that Carroll used her. Account by transferring balances 
from other credit cards she had. R Vol. 3, pp. 515-17 (Affidavit of Sheila Schwager ("Schwager 
Aff."), ~ 4, Ex. l; 574-75 (Ryning Aff., ~~ 3-6); 639-641. In response to discovery, Carrol] 
admitted that she requested such transfers and that Citibank complied with her requests. 
R Vol. 3, pp. 515-17 (Schwager Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 1). 
In support of Summary Judgment, Citibank submitted the Account Statements, reflecting 
the activity on the Account from August 18, 2003 through January 17, 2005. R Vol. 3, pp. 575, 
580-617. The Account Statements reflect that in or about December 2003, Carroll initiated a 
series of balance transfers for a total sum of$24,800. R Vol. 3, pp. 574-75 (Ryning Aff., ~~ 3-4), 
580-617. The Account Statements also reflect that Carroll made the minimum payments on the 
Account from February 1, 2004 through November 29, 2004. R Vol. 3, p. 575 (Ryning Aff., 
~ 5), 592-612. However, Carroll's last payment on the Account posted November 29, 2004. 
R Vol. 3, p. 575 (Ryning Aff., ~ 5). 
On January 3, 2005, Citibank received a letter from Carroll, claiming with no specificity 
or basis that the entire balance on the Account was inaccurate. R Vol. 3, p. 575 (Ryning Aff., 
~ 7). Citibank responded by letter dated January 7, 2005, advising Carrol] that the credit 
extended on the Account was valid and that Carroll needed to remit payment. R Vol. 3, p. 575 
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(Ryning Aff., ~ 7), 618 (January 7, 2005 Letter). Citibank never received any further response 
from Carroll. R Vol. 3, p. 575 (Ryning Aff., ~ 7). Since November 2004, Carroll has .not made 
any payments on the Account. R Vol. 3, p. 576 (Ryning Aff., ~ 10). 
2. The Litigation. 
On January 19, 2007, Citibank filed its Summary Judgment Motion, seeking summary 
judgment on its claim against Carroll for the underlying debt (on a breach of contract theory) and 
on Carroll's counterclaims. R Vol. 3, pp. 630-657. As the record demonstrates, Citibank is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and fact based upon the undisputed evidence, 
including an affidavit of a Citibank custodian of records (the Ryning Affidavit), Account records 
(including the Account Statements and Card Agreement) and Carroll's admissions in response to 
discovery requests. R Vol. 3, pp. 630-657. 
Rather than addressing Citibank's evidence or rebutting Citibank's evidence regarding 
her use of the Account ( which is undisputed), Carroll raised the issue of standing, arguing that 
Citibank supposedly did not have standing and/or was required to be licensed pursuant to the 
ICCA, and that Citibank did not have standing to collect the debt on the Account due to 
Citibank's securitization of its credit card receivables. RVoL 3, pp. 720-724. As a result, the 
District Court permitted limited briefing and discovery on the issues of the application of the 
ICCA and the relationship between Citibank and the Citibank Credit Card Master Trust I (the 
"Master Trust") and the Citibank Credit Card Issuance Trust (the "Issuance Trust"). R Vol. I, 
pp. 71-72. In support, Citibank submitted, and both parties relied upon, documents regarding 
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Citibank's affiliation, control and beneficial relationship with the Master Trust and Issuance 
Trust. R Vol. 5, pp. 1049-13 76. 
On December 10, 2007, following oral argument by the parties, the District Court granted 
summaryjudgment. After consideration of the parties' submissions and argument, the District 
Court correctly concluded that Citibank did have standing to collect the debt: 
As owner of the account, Citibank has standing to collect the debt 
owed on the account. It is of no moment that Citibank 
contractually obliged itself to transfer money it collects on its 
accounts to the Master Trust. Citibank's obligations to the Master 
Trust to transfer the money collected does not affect Ms. Carroll's 
contractual relationship with and obligation to Citibank. I 
therefore conclude that Citibank has standing to bring this suit to 
collect the credit card debt owed by Ms. Carroll on this account. 
R Vol. I, pp. 189-90.2 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether Citibank is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal based 
upon Idaho Codes§ 12-120, § 12-121, and/or§ 12-123, and the terms of the contract? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review. 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, "this Court's standard ofreview 
is the same as the standard used by the district court in passing upon a motion for summary 
judgment." Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 184 P. 3d 860,863 (2008) (citing 
2 The District Court also correctly found that Citibank, as a national bank, is a "regulated 
lender" for purposes of the ICCA and, therefore, exempt from compliance with the ICCA. 
R Vol. 1, p. 191. Carroll does not challenge this holding on appeal. 
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Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg!. Med Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997)). 
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents on file 
with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material 
issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Brewer, 
184 P. 3d at 863 (citing l.R.C.P. 56(c)). "In making this determination, all allegations of fact in 
the record, and all reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion." City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd, 135 Idaho 
239,243, 16 PJd 915,919 (2000). 
However, the party responding to a summary judgment motion, while not required to 
present evidence on every element of his or her claim, "must establish a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party." Primary 
Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 666, 52 P.3d 307, 3 IO (2002). 
The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material 
fact exists to withstand summary judgment. Id A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt 
as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of 
summary judgment. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380,385 (2005). 
The party opposing the motion may not merely rest on the allegations contained in the pleadings; 
rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition must be produced to contradict the assertions 
of the moving party. LR.C.P. 56(e); Ambrose By and Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School 
Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581,887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1995). Raising the slightest doubt 
as to the facts is insufficient - - a genuine issue of material fact must be presented. Id If the 
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evidence reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact, "then all that remains is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review." Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 
171,175,923 P.2d 416,420 (1996). 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). Abuse of discretion is 
determined by a three part test which asks whether the district court "(1) correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion;(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 
139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475,479 (2004). 
B. It Is Undisputed That Citibank Does, And Always Has, Owned The Account; 
Therefore, Citibank Has Standing And Is The Real Party In Interest For Purposes 
Of Collecting The Debt Owed By Carroll On The Account. 
1. The Undisputed Evidence Establishes That Citibank Owns The Account. 
It is well-settled that, to maintain an action, a party must have standing and, to have 
standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the 
judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Bowles v. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 
132 Idaho 371,375,973 P. 3d 142, 146 (1999). Put differently, the plaintiff"must allege such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which 
sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends." Id. ( citing Miles v. Idaho Power 
Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989)); see also I.R.C.P l 7(a) ("Every action shall 
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."). 
- 8 -
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Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that Citibank is and always has been the owner 
of the Account. The pertinent facts have, and continue to be, straightforward and simple: 
(1) Carroll entered into a credit card agreement with Citibank; (2) Carroll agreed to pay for all 
transactions made on the Account; (3) Carroll used, and incurred charges, on the Account; and 
( 4) Carroll failed to pay the Account. There is simply no evidence that Citibank sold the 
Account. Rather, the Ryning Affidavit (which is not disputed) expressly confirms that "Citibank 
has been the owner of the Account since the inception of the Account and remains so today." 
R Vol. 3, p. 576 (18). 
Critically, Carroll fails to identify any evidence or fact demonstrating that Citibank ever 
sold Carroll's Account to another entity. Nor does she cite any evidence showing that Citibank 
ever assigned to another entity Carroll's obligation (under her credit card agreement) to repay 
Citibank for the debt she incurred on her Account. Instead, Carroll strings together cherry-
picked excerpts from the various documents produced by Citibank to argue that Citibank should 
be deemed to have sold the Account ( even though it did not) based on the asset securitization 
process used for Citibank's credit card receivables. Not only is Carroll's skewed interpretation 
of securitization inaccurate (as discussed below), but she has not, and cannot, raise a triable issue 
of fact regarding Citibank's undisputed ownership of the Acco.unt. The only truth that is clear 
from this appeal is that Carroll will go to any and aJJ lengths to avoid paying her undisputed 
credit card debt. 
- 9 -
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a. Citibank's Securitization Process. 
Securitization3 is a process by which national banks, like Citibank, convert credit card 
receivables into capital. See In re Spiegel, Inc. Securities Litigation, 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1001 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (describing generally the asset/credit card receivables securitization process). 
The documents relied upon by both parties before the District Court confirm that throughout the 
securitization process, Citibank retains complete ownership of the credit card accounts involved. 4 
The securitization documents describe the critical aspects of Citibank's securitizati_on process as 
follows: 
The process begins by Citibank assigning an interest in certain of its credit card 
receivables5 to an entity known as the Master Trust. R Vol. 5, p. 1155:1-6 (stating that Citibank 
"established the master trust" on May 29, 199 l ), p. 1155 :7-11 (stating that Citibank sponsors 
"programs of securitization of credit card receivables" through the "establishment of 
3 
4 
5 
Asset securitization is the "structured process whereby interests in loans, and other 
· receivables are packaged, underwritten, and sold in the form of 'asset-backed' securities." 
R Vol. 6, p. 1399 (OCC Comptroller's Handbook, "Asset Securitization", at 2), p. 1442 
(OCC Comptroller's Handbook, "Credit Card Lending", at 52 ("Securitization is the pooling 
of assets with similar characteristics into a standard format for sale to investors.")). 
The documents primarily consist of the Citibank Credit Card Master Trust I Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement (the "Pooling Agreement") (R Vol. 4, pp. 911-1004), and the 
February 5, 2007 Prospectus and the March 14, 2007 Prospectus Supplement, both of which 
were prepared by Citibank. R Vol. 5, p. 1041, fn.l. 
It should be noted that receivables relating to accounts that have been charged off are not part 
of the Master Trust. R Vol. 5, p. 1193 (Prospectus, Annex I, p. Al-4). "When accounts are 
charged off, they are written off as losses in accordance with the credit card guidelines, and 
the related receivables are removed from the Master Trust." Id. Carroll's Account was 
charged off prior to Citibank suing to collect the Account. 
- 10 -
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securitization vehicles such as ... the master trust"). Importantly, while the credit card 
receivables are transferred to the Master Trust, "Citibank (South Dakota) is the owner of all of 
the credit card accounts designated to the master trust." R Vol. 5, p. I 156:28-29; see also 
R Vol. 5, p. 1075:28-30 (noting that, despite the sale of the receivables to the Master Trust, 
Citibank continues to "own the accounts themselves"). Indeed, the Pooling Agreement clearly 
states that the transfer of the receivables to the Master Trust does not transfer or otherwise affect 
the ownership of the underlying credit card accounts: 
The [ conveyance ofreceivab!es] does not constitute and is not 
intended to result in the creation or assumption by the Trust, the 
Trustee, any Investor Certificateholder ... of any obligation of the 
Servicer, Citibank (South Dakota), Citibank (Nevada), any 
Additional Seller, any other Account Owner or any other Person in 
connection with the Accounts or the Receivables or under any 
agreement or instrument relating thereto, including any obligation 
to Obligors [i.e., accountholders]. 
R Vol. 4, pp. 937-36 (Pooling Agreement,§ 2.01, under the heading, "Conveyance of 
Receivables"). 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Citibank retains "the right to determine the fees, 
periodic finance charges ... and other charges that will apply to the credit card accounts." 
R Vol. 5, p. 1075:30-32; see also R Vol. 4, pp. 944-45 (Pooling Agreement,§ 2.08(b), under 
heading "Credit Card Agreements and Guidelines") (stating that Citibank "may change the terms 
and provisions of the Credit Card Agreements or the Credit Card Guidelines in any respect 
(including the calculation of the amount or the timing of charge-offs and the Periodic Rate 
Finance Charges to be assessed thereon") subject to limited conditions}. Moreover, Citibank 
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retains the exclusive right of establishing the "credit and risk criteria for the origination and 
acquisition of credit card accounts owned by it, including the accounts in the master trust." 
RVol. 5,p.1155:19-20. 
Subsequently, the Master Trust issues a "collateral certificate", which is an investor 
certificate representing an undivided interest in the assets of the Master Trust (primarily, the 
credit card receivables), to an entity known as the Issuance Trust. 6 R Vol. 5, p. l l l3:l 7-l8 
(describing the "collateral certificate"). The Issuance Trust sells notes to third party investors 
(backed by the collateral certificate), and the "issuance trust will pay the proceeds from the sale 
ofa class of notes" to Citibank. R Vol. 5, p. 1089 (under the heading "USE OF PROCEEDS"). 
In exchange, the Issuance Trust (through Citibank as manager of the Issuance Trust) pays 
investors principal and/or interest on such notes from the amounts received by the Issuance Trust 
under the collateral certificate. R Vol. 5, p. 1072. The Master Trust exists for the sole benefit of 
the certificate holders (R Vol. 5, p. 1297 (Pooling Agreement§ 2.02, p. 22)), and the primary 
certificate holder in the Master Trust is the Issuance Trust. R Vol. 5, p. 1113 (noting that the 
Issuance Trust is the "holder of the collateral certificate"). Citibank, as the sole owner and 
6 It is important to note that the undisputed evidence establishes that Citibank is the primary 
beneficiary of, and exerts direct control over, the Issuance Trust. R Vol. 5, pp. !056-57 
(under the heading "Manager of the Issuance Trust" stating that Citibank "is the manager of 
the issuance trust, and is responsible for malcing determinations with respect to the issuance 
trust and allocating funds received by the issuance trust."); p. l 088 (stating that "[a]s 
manager of the issuance trust, [Citibank] will generally direct the actions to be taken by the 
issuance trust."); p. 1089 (under the heading "The Owner" stating that Citibank "is the sole 
owner of the beneficial interests in the issuance trust."). 
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manager of the Issuance Trust, is, therefore, the primary beneficiary of the Master Trust. 
R Vol. 5, pp. 1043-45 (discussing Citibank's securitization process). 
b. Citibank Is The Owner Of The Account. 
Based upon the foregoing, and the undisputed evidence in the record, notwithstanding the 
transfer of its credit card receivables to the Master Trust, Citibank continues to own Carroll's 
Account, including prior to, and at the time of, filing the underlying collection case. The District 
Court correctly recognized this important factor in ruling that Citibank has standing to maintain 
the underlying collection action. The District Court stated: 
Nothing in the evidence suggests that Citibank transferred to the 
Master Trust anything more than the receivables on Ms. Carroll's 
account.[] To the contrary, Citibank Credit Card Trust's 
Prospectus specifically provides that '[t]he master trust owns the 
credit card receivables generated in designed credit card accounts, 
but [Citibank] will continue to own the accounts themselves.' 
[Citation omitted]. 
The transfer of the accounts is not definitionally included in the 
transfer of the receivables as argued by Ms. Carroll. The 
receivables are separate from the account, and one can be 
transferred without the other. The record reflects that 
Ms. Carroll's account was retained by Citibank. As owner of the 
account, Citibank has standing to collect the debt owed on the 
account. It is of no moment that Citibank contractually obliged 
itself to transfer the money it collects on its accounts to the Master 
Trust. Citibank's obligation to the Master Trust to transfer the 
money collected does not affect Ms. Carroll's contractual 
relationship with and obligation to Citibank. 
R Vol. I, p. 189. The District Court's reasoning is sourid, rooted in the undisputed evidence and 
should be affirmed. 
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Further, the District Court's Order is consistent with the position of the Office of 
Comptroller of Currency ("OCC") - - the agency specifically empowered by Congress to 
regulate national banks, like Citibank - - on this issue. 7 As the agency "charged with supervision 
of the National Bank Act," the OCC's regulations have the force of federal law. See 
NationsBank of NC., NA. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,256 (1995); see also 
12 U.S.C. § 93a (broad grant ofrulemaking power to OCC);Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), NA., 
11 Cal. 4th 138, 156 (1995), a{f'd, 517 U.S. 735 (1996). 8 
Importantly, the OCC has determined that the powers conferred under the National Bank 
Act include the "broad authority to buy and sell loan assets" and "broad authority to borrow 
7 
8 
It is undisputed that the OCC is tasked with the exclusive authority to regulate the national 
banking system. See 12 U.S.C. § 93a; Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 
1564 (2007) ("As the agency charged by Congress with supervision of the NBA, OCC 
oversees the operations of national banks and their interactions with customers."). The OCC 
"exercises visitorial powers, including the authority to audit the bank's books and records, 
largely to the exclusion of other goverrunental entities, staie or federal." Watters, 127 S. Ct. 
at 1564. State-court litigation that would "prevent or significantly interfere with the national 
bank's exercise of its powers" is preempted by the United States Constitution's Supremacy 
Clause, Article VI, cl. 2. Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996); accord 
Marquette Nat'/ Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.299,314-15 (1978); Watters, 
127 S. Ct. at 1566-67 ("In the years since the NBA's enactment, we have repeatedly made 
clear that federal control shields national banking from unduly burdensome and duplicative 
state regulation."). 
The OCC also is the appropriate regulator with respect to the debt collection programs and 
activities of national banks. See OCC Interpretive Letter, 1985 WL 151323 (Aug. 27, 1985) 
("[I]t is both usual and necessary for banks to undertake collection activities with respect to 
their own delinquent loans."); see also NationsBank of N. C., 513 U.S. at 258 n.2 ( defining 
the "business of banking" and national banks' "incidental powers" broadly); Burgos v. 
Citibank, NA., 432 F.3d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (collection activity engaged in by a national 
bank "is simply 'part and parcel' of a customary banking activity"). 
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money and to pledge their assets as collateral for such borrowings" (OCC Interpretive Letter 
No. 540, 1991 WL 570780 at *2 (June 1991) (citations omitted)), and "[e]stablishing credit card 
accounts and generating accounts receivable evidencing extensions of credit." OCC Corporate 
Decision No. 98-39, 1998 WL 667884, at *4 (Mar. 27, 1998) (approving securitization of credit 
card receivables by Citibank, N.A. through subsidiary). Specifically, the OCC authorizes the 
securitization of credit card receivables by permitting national banks to sell credit card 
receivables and use them as collateral for an investment security: 
Credit card receivables are loan assets evidencing loans made on 
personal security. [Citations]. National banks may purchase and 
sell these loan assets pursuant to their authority to discount and 
negotiate evidences of debt. Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has long recognized that the negotiation, i.e., the sale, of 
evidences of debt acquired through a national bank's express 
authority to lend money on the security ofreal estate is authorized 
as part of the business of banking under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). 
See First National Bank of Hartford v. City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 
548 (1927). Similarly, as the OCC stated in Interpretive Letter No. 
416, the negotiation of loans made on personal security is also part 
of the business of banking. Accordingly, the Bank is authorized to 
sell its credit card receivables through use of the Subsidiary. In 
addition, because national banks are authorized to borrow money 
and to pledge their assets as collateral therefore, the Subsidiary is 
authorized to borrow funds in the market using the credit card 
receivables as collateral. 
The use of securitization to accomplish the sale of the receivables 
or as a vehicle for borrowing against them is a permissible means 
by which a national bank may carry out these activities. As the 
OCC has previously noted, securitization is simply a means for 
effecting the selling, purchasing, borrowing and lending functions 
of the secondary market. [Citation]. Through use of the various 
securitization structures, banks are able to sell and borrow against 
their assets in this market more efficlently. 
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OCC Interpretive Letter No. 540, 1991 WL 570780 at *3 (approving transaction in which 
national bank subsidiary would sell bank's credit card receivables to trust, bank would continue 
to service all receivables through affiliate and subsidiary would cause trust to issue participation 
certificates to investors); see OCC Corporate Decision, 1998 WL 667884, at *4 (approving the 
securitization of credit card receivables "as part of the business of banking" and a "permissible 
activity for a national bank"). 
In furtherance of its exclusive regulatory authority over national banks, the OCC issues a 
detailed Comptroller's Handbook" - essentially a compendium of bank policies, procedures and 
guidelines - - regarding the examination of the commercial activities of national banks, 
including, without limitation, asset securitization and the risks and advantages involved in asset 
securitization.9 Importantly, the OCC acknowledges that the activities of a "servicer" in the asset 
securitization process (Citibank, here) include "customer service and payment processing for the 
borrowers in the securitized pool and collection actions in accordance with the pooling and 
servicing agreement. Servicing can also include default management and collateral liquidation." 
R VoL 6, p. 1407:4-7. Not only do these materials demonstrate that the OCC has a system in 
place by which it regularly reviews and examines the asset securitization activities of national 
9 Given their size, only copies of the relevant sections of the "Asset Securitization" and 
"Credit Card Lending" sections of the Comptroller's Handbook are part of the record (at 
R Vol. 6, pp. 1393-1463). Complete copies of the "Asset Securitization" and "Credit Card 
Lending" sections of the Comptroller's Handbook can be found at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/SS.HTM. 
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banks, but the original issuer of the credit card receivable subject to securitization retains the 
power to collect the underlying debt as part of the "servicer" role. 
The OCC instructs that the credit relationship between Carroll and Citibank continues to 
exist unchanged after transfer of the receivables to the Master Trust. R Vol. 6, p. 1405 
(OCC Comptroller's Handbook: "Asset Securitization" at 8 (recognizing that benefit of asset 
securitization process is that "originating bank is often able to maintain the customer 
relationship.")), p. 1407 (OCC Comptroller's Handbook: "Asset Securitization" at IO (stating 
that duties of original lender as "servicer" include customer service, payment processing, 
collection actions and default management)). 
Thus, as correctly recognized by the District Court and the OCC, despite the transfer of 
its credit card receivables to the Master Trust, Citibank remains the owner of the Account and 
remains obligated to perform under the Card Agreement governing the Account, and Carroll 
remains obligated to, among other things, repay the debt incurred on the Account. This is 
different from the situation in which ownership of an account, note or debt is assigned to a 
different, unrelated entity or financial institution. In that case, the new entity or financial 
institution assumes the former holder's rights and obligations under the note or account. Thus, 
unlike McCluskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472,522 P.2d 289 (1973) - - a decision relied upon by 
Carroll - - Citibank's credit relationship with Carroll remains the same, even after Citibank's 
transfer of its receivables to the Master Trust. In McCluskey, it was undisputed that "all of the 
promissory notes and open accounts, sued upon had been previously assigned" by the individual 
plaintiff to the corporate plaintiff(McCluskey, 95 Idaho at 473); on that basis, the court held that 
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the individual plaintiff was not the real party in interest because he "no longer had any right, title 
or interest in the promissory notes and open account" and, therefore, any judgment rendered in 
the case could only be collected by the corporate plaintiff. Id, at 474-75. 
Nevertheless, Carroll tries (unsuccessfully) to manufacture the appearance of a factual 
issue by plucking out different provisions of the Pooling Agreement to suggest that Citibank 
transferred ownership of the accounts, when it really only sold its credit card receivables to the 
Master Trust. Carroll argues that the Pooling Agreement "essentially treats the receivables and 
the accounts in the same manner" and, therefore, "both the account and the receivables were sold 
and assigned to the Master Trust." Brief at p. 16; see also p. 22 ( citing Section 2.09(ii) and the 
definition, "Required Lump Additions"). 10 According to Carroll, the transfer of"all right, title 
and interest" in the receivables supposedly means that Citibank transferred its obligations in 
connection with her Account (including collecting the amount owing on the Account). Brief at 
pp. 13-14. Carroll also argues (without any supporting authority) that, under the Pooling 
Agreement, "receivables" are defined as an "'account' under the [UCC] in effect in the State of 
10 In the case of"Lump Additions," Carroll fails to cite any portion of the Pooling Agreement, 
Prospectus or Prospectus Supplement even suggesting that asset contributions under this 
provision also convey ownership interests in the underlying accounts. The reference to 
"revolving credit card accounts and collections thereon" as part of any "Lump Additions" 
(Brief at p. 22 citing Pooling Agreement Section 2.09(ii)) is nothing more than a pledge to 
designate additional accounts, whose receivables will be transferred to the Master Trust (at a 
later date and subject to specific conditions). In fact, the Prospectus Supplement, in 
describing "Lump Additions", specifically states that Citibank "may from time to time 
transfer credit card receivables to the master trust in lump additions by designating accounts 
to the master trust." R Vol. 4, p. 756 (under the heading "Recent Lump Additions"); see also 
R Vol. 5, pp. 1223 (same). Of course, Carroll conveniently ignores these provisions. 
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South Dakota" and that the UCC (as adopted in South Dakota) defines "account" as "a right to 
payment of a money obligation ... arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or 
information contained on or for use with the card." Brief at 13 (citing S.D.C. Title 57A § 9-
102(2)). 
Contrary to Carroll's skewed interpretation, such definitions neither raise an issue of fact 
regarding the ownership of the Account nor establish that the Master Trust is the owner of the 
Account. Initially, it is undisputed that "Citibank has been the owner of the Account since the 
inception of the Account and remains so today." R Vol. 3, p. 576 (18). Indeed, as conceded by 
Carroll, the Pooling Agreement expressly defines an "Eligible Account" as a "credit card account 
owned by Citibank (South Dakota) .... " Brief, at p. 11 (citing R Vol. 4, p. 922) (emphasis 
added). Further, the District Court correctly rejected Carroll's contentions, finding that, at most, 
such definitions "simply clarify that [the) Master Trust has a right as owner of the credit card 
receivables to receive from Citibank the payments Citibank receives on its credit card accounts." 
R Vol. 1, p. 189, fn.l. Citibank does not dispute that the Master Trust has the right to receive 
those amounts collected by Citibank .relating to its credit card accounts that Citibank has 
designated to the Master Trust.· However, the Master Trust's interest in such receivables is 
completely separate and apart from Carroll's and Citibank's obligations to one another arising 
from the Card Agreement. The Pooling Agreement is clear: Citibank's conveyance of"all its 
right, title and interest in" its credit card receivables "does not constitute and is not intended to 
result in the creation or assumption by the [Master] Trust ... of any obligation of [Citibank] in 
connection with the Accounts or the Receivables or under any agreement or instrument relating 
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thereto, including any obligation to Obligors [i.e., accountholders]." R Vol. 4, pp. 937-38 
(Pooling Agreement§ 2.01). Not surprisingly, while Carroll cites Section 2.01 (see Brief at 11), 
she fails to quote the foregoing language that entirely debunks her thesis. Thus, Carroll's 
suggestion that there is "nothing" in the Pooling Agreement "that states Citibank retains 
ownership of the account" after transfer of its receivables is wrong and directly contradicted by 
the record. 1 I Citibank never sold Carroll's Account. Accordingly, the Court's Order and 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
2. Citibank Has Standing Becanse Citibank Controls And Is The Primary 
Beneficiary Of The Trusts Involved In the Securitization Process. 
An additional reason for affirming theDistrict Court's Order and Judgment is the fact 
that it is undisputed that Citibank is the primary beneficiary of, and exerts direct control over, the 
Issuance and Master Trusts, as discussed above. Carroll contends that, by relinquishing control 
over the receivables to the trustee, Citibank no longer owns her Account and, therefore, is not the · 
"real party in interest" for purposes of collecting her debt. Opening Brief, pp. 11-16. This 
argument is unavailing for several reasons. 
First, the Ryning Affidavit specifically states: "Citibank has been the owner of the 
Account since the inception of the Account and remains so today." R Vol. 3, p. 576 (18). In 
I I Other definitions in the Pooling Agreement buttress the conclusion that Citibank is, and 
remains, the owner of the accounts at issue. See R Vol. 4, p. 917 ( defining "Account Owner" 
as "any Seller ... which is the issuer [i.e., Citibank] of the credit card relating to an Account 
established pursuant to a Credit Card Agreement."), p. 921 (defining "Credit Card 
Agreement" as the "agreements between Citibank ... or other Account Owner ... and the 
Obligor [i.e., accountholder] governing the terms and conditions of such account"). 
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this respect, the Ryning Affidavit is undisputed and Carroll has neither submitted nor cited any 
rebuttal evidence. Nor can she based on the securitization documents. See, e.g., R Vol. 5, 
p. 1156:28-29 ("Citibank (South Dakota) is the owner of all of the credit card accounts 
designated to the master trust."); R Vol. 5, p. 1075:28-30 (noting that, despite the sale of the 
receivables to the Master Trust, Citibank continues to "own the accounts themselves"); R Vol. 4, 
p. 922: 28-29 (defining "Eligible Account" as a "credit card account owned by Citibank (South 
Dakota) ... "). 
Second, Carroll overlooks, and it is undisputed, that Citibank - - not the trustee - - will 
"direct the actions to be taken by the issuance trust" and, under the trust agreement, the role of 
the trustee is "limited to ministerial actions," while "[a]ll material actions concerning the 
issuance trust are taken by [Citibank] as managing beneficiary of the issuance trust." R Vol. 5, 
pp. 1088-89 (Prospectus at pp. 33, 34). Moreover, the Pooling Agreement expressly instructs 
that Citibank is the servicer of the receivables, and "shall have full power an authority ... to do 
all things in connection with such servicing and administration which it may deem necessary or 
desirable." R VoL 4, p. 952:14-17 (Section 3.0l(b)). 
Third, Citibank- - not the trustee - - is the "manager of the issuance trust" (R Vol. 5, 
p. 1155:7), and Citibank possesses the exclusive right to add and remove receivables from the 
Master Trust. R Vol. 5, p. 1158 (Prospectus at 103). 
Fourth, the Master Trust does not have any employees and "does not engage in any 
activity other than acquiring and holding trust assets and the proceeds of those assets, issuing 
series of investor certificates, making distributions and related activities." R. Vol. 5, p. 1156 
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(Prospectus at 101 ). Furthermore, with respect to the Issuance Trust, the issuing of certificates 
and distributions, among other things, ultimately is handled by Citibank (as "managing 
beneficiary of the issuance trust"). See R Vol. 5, pp. 1088-89; see also R Vol. 5, p. 1072 
(describing how the Issuance Trust (through Citibank as manager of the Issuance Trust) pays 
investors principal and/or interest on the notes sold to third party investors). 
Simply put, it is undisputed that neither the trustee nor the Master Trust obtain any 
indicia of ownership of the credit card accounts as part ofthe asset securitization process. The 
evidence relied upon by both parties is undisputed and makes clear that Citibank does not 
transfer ownership of the accounts, either specifically or implicitly, by merely transferring the 
underlying receivables to the Master Trust. 
Accordingly, Carroll's suggestion that summary judgment was improper because the 
District Court improperly "weighed the evidence" is not supported by the record or the cases 
cited by Carroll. Despite her erroneous characterization of the securitization process, the 
securitization documents speak for themselves and there is no dispute as to their content. 12 The 
12 Carroll disingenuously claims that the Prospectus and Prospectus Supplement somehow are 
insufficient evidence of Citibank's ownership of her Account (and other accounts possibly 
involved in the securitization process). See Brief at pp. 14, 23. This is not well-taken for a 
number of reasons, including that Carroll cites to the Prospectus Supplement in her Brief(at 
p. 22) and she relied upon the Prospectus and Supplement in making her arguments to the 
District Court. SeeRVo!.1,pp. 75,80, 108,110, 167-69, 174. Therealityisthatthe 
Prospectus documents, which are required by federal securities laws, provide a succinct and 
accurate description of the transactions for the purpose of advising investors, who rely upon 
the information disclosed. Indeed, in addressing the issue of account ownership and the real 
party in interest in the context of asset securitization, courts often look to prospectuses. See 
Discover Bankv. Vaden, 489 F.3d 594,603 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that a "final source of 
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cases cited by Carroll - - Tolmie Farms v. JR. Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 613, 862 P.2d 305 
(Ct. App. 1992), Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 695 P.2d 413 (Ct. App. 1985), and Altman v. 
Arndt, 109 Idaho 218, 706 P.2d 107 (1985)- - are easily distinguishable. In each case, the 
conflicting evidence submitted by the parties in support of, or in opposition to, summary 
judgment raised questions regarding the credibility or weight of the evidence or the witnesses 
involved and, more importantly, raised issues of material fact. See, e.g., Tolmie, 124 Idaho at 
620 13 (holding that any "dearth" of evidence on the issue of standing went to the weight of 
evidence); Riggs, 107 Idaho at l 030-3 I ( denying summary judgment because conflicting facts 
regarding defendant's conduct during assault were susceptible to different interpretations and 
thus raised triable issues of fact as to the defendant's intentions in drawing his knife); Altman, 
109 Idaho at 220-21 ( denying summary judgment where the terms of the contract at issue were 
ambiguous and the pleadings and affidavits presented "divergent" interpretations and holding 
that only by weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses could the court 
support for the conclusion that Discover Bank is the real party in interest is found in Discover 
Bank's financial statement and prospectuses for the sale of interests in credit card receivables 
through securitizations."); see id. (noting that the prospectuses "identify Discover Bank as 
the issuer of ... and owner of the Discover Card account" and "reaffirm Discover Bank's 
right to set the terms for essential aspects of a cardholder' s account"). 
13 It is important to note that the Tolmie decision cited by Carroll was reversed in part by this 
Court in Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. JR. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607,862 P.2d 299 (1993). 
This Court clarified that the "absence of such tangible evidence [ on the issue of whether 
plaintiffs were real parties in interest] might become significant when Simplot argues the 
issue of credibility to the jury," but that argument "goes to the weight of the evidence." 
Tolmie, 124 !daho at 613. 
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reach a decision on summary judgment). Here, in contrast, the evidence (i.e., the securitization 
documents) is undisputed. 
In the end, Citibank not only is the primary beneficiary of the Issuance Trust and Master 
Trust, but Citibank has direct control over such Trusts. Also, Citibank is responsible for 
servicing, managing, determining which receivables are included or removed from the Master 
Trust and allocating funds received by the Master Trust. Therefore, both trust entities and 
Citibank are under common ownership and control, and therefore, there is no dispute that 
Citibank continues to, and always has, owned the Account. Thus, the District Court's Order and 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied CarroH's Motion For Reconsideration. 
In her Brief, Carroll argues that the District Court erred by failing to grant her motion for 
reconsideration. The gist of Carroll's argument is that, on reconsideration, Carroll challenged 
"Citibank as not being a real party in interest.'' Brief at 9:27. This is the same argument as 
Carroll's standing argument discussed above. See Brief at 10:1-4. 
On appeal, Carroll fails to identify why the District Court's order denying the 
Reconsideration Motion (R Vol. 1, pp. 233-34) was in error. As the record establishes, after 
receiving briefing from both parties and after oral argument, the District Court denied Carroll's 
motion. Indeed, at the January 24, 2008 hearing, the District Court recognized that the issue at 
the heart of Carroll's reconsideration motion - - Citibank's standing to collect her debt - - had 
been extensively briefed by the parties and repeatedly considered by the Court: 
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Well, you know, I have to say I have gone - I've tried to go the 
extra mile to give everybody a fair chance in this case. And I have 
done what the Supreme Court tells me not to do. I'm supposed to 
treat pro se people the same as I would treat lawyers.... But there 
does come a time when there's a need for finality, I think.... And I 
do think that on a motion for reconsideration it does require 
evidence rather than a request for discovery to get more 
evidence.... As to the standing, you know, I have struggled with 
that. I've been through it and through it and through it. And I may 
be proven wrong, but I think I'm right. ... So, I'm going to deny 
the motions. And I deny them knowing that you put your heart and 
soul into this, but I don't think I have any choice. I think we're at 
the end of the line here. 
Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 51:10-52:16. 
Put simply, after receiving extensive briefing on the issue of Citibank's standing, oral 
argument, and issuing a detailed order, specifically finding that the "record reflects that 
Ms. Carroll's account was retained by Citibank" and "[a]s the owner of the account, Citibank has 
standing to collect the debt owed on the account," the District Court entertained essentially the 
same argument from Carroll and essentially reviewed the record again before denying the 
reconsideration motion. The District Court correctly determined that Carroll failed to identify 
any new evidence refuting that Citibank is the owner of the Account. Thus, there was no basis 
on which to grant the reconsideration motion. 
For the reasons discussed herein, the District Court's Order is sound and should be 
affirmed, including with respect to the District Court's Order denying the Reconsideration 
Motion. 
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D. Citibank Satisfied Its Burden Of Submitting Undisputed Evidence That Proves Its 
Straightforward Claims Against Carroll, Including Its Claim For Damages. 
Carroll argues that that Citibank failed to produce any evidence of damages on its breach 
of contract claim. Brief, pp. 16-23. This argument is nothing more than a repackaging of her 
primary argument that Citibank did not have standing to collect the debt owing on the Account. 
That is, Carroll maintains, without citing to any supporting evidence, that Citibank could not 
prove damages because it did not own the Account. As discussed in detail above, this argument 
fails. The undisputed evidence establishes that Citibank is, and at all times was, the owner of the 
Account. 
Moreover, the undisputed facts presented to the District Court establish Citibank's 
damages on the breach of contract claim - - to wit, the unpaid balance owing on the Account. 
R Vol. 3, pp. 574-76 (Ryning Aff., ,r,r 2-10), pp. 580-617 (Account Statements). Importantly, on 
appeal, Carroll does not dispute, nor does she challenge that portion of the Order or Judgment, 
that the she is indebted for the amounts owing on the Account. 
It is well-settled that Carroll's use of the Account (which is undisputed) manifested her 
consent to be bound by the Card Agreement's terms. See, e.g., Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 
A.2d 304,309 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff"unequivocally manifested 
acceptance" of her cardholder agreement by making purchases and payments on her account); 
AT&T Universal Card Services v. Mercer, 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
"[defendant's] card-use (conduct) was a loan request and promise to pay"); Jones v. Citibank 
(South Dakota), N.A., 235 S.W.3d 333,336 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (reasoning that the "issuance of 
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a credit card constitutes a credit offer, and the use of the card constitutes acceptance of the offer" 
such that a contract is formed "under federal law"); Taylor v. First North America Nat 'l Bank, 
325 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (A "credit card holder's use of her card signals her 
assent to the terms of the credit card agreement."); see also R VoI. 3, p. 619 (Ryning Aff., Ex. 4 
(Card Agreement) ("This Agreement is binding on you unless you cancel your account within 
30 days after receiving the card and you have not used or authorized use of your account."). 
Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that Carroll used the Account for a number of 
years (beginning in 1999) before she defaulted by failing to continue to make payments on the 
Account (after November 2004). R Vol. 3, pp. 574-76 (Ryning Aff., 112-10), pp. 580-617 
(Account Statements). Carroll cited no rebuttal evidence before the District Court and, in fact, 
admitted using the Account in response to discovery. R Vol. 3, pp. 522-24 (Carroll's responses 
to Request for Admission ("RF A") Nos. 38, 40, 43, 46-52, 54). The undisputed evidence 
establishes that Carroll breached the Card Agreement by failing to pay the balance owed. Under 
the terms of the Card Agreement, Carroll was in "default" because she failed and r<l!fused to 
make the required payments on the Account. R Vol. 3, p. 621 (under the heading "Default"). 
Citibank has been damaged by Carroll's breach because, while Citibank extended credit to 
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Carroll at her request, Carroll has failed to pay the balance incurred. 14 See, e.g., Shurtlijfv. 
Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 267-69, 815 P.2d 461, 465-69 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing 
the elements of a breach of contract claim for money owed as the existence of a contract, the 
breach or failure to perform and damages). Accordingly, the District Court's Order should be 
affirmed. 
E. Citibank Is Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs On Appeal. 
Citibank is entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3), 
LC.§ 12-121, and/or J.C.§ 12-123, and I.A.R. 41. Idaho law mandates the enforcement of 
contractual provisions granting attorney fees and costs. J.C.§ 12-120(3); Mountainview 
Landowners CocOp Ass 'n, Inc., v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.2d 332, 337 (2006) ("Contract 
provisions for attorney fees are generally enforced."); Opportunity L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 
Idaho 602, 610, 38 P.3d 1258, 1266 (2002); Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 787, 874 P.2d 
595, 598 (Ct. App. 1994). In general, this section mandates an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party on an appeal as well in the trial court. Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 7.27 
P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986). 
14 The Ryning Affidavit and accompanying exhibits (including the Account Statements) (at 
R Vol. 3, pp. 573-617) confirm that Citibank extended credit to Carroll (by honoring and 
paying the balance transfer requests initiated by Carroll), and that Carroll failed to make any 
payments on the Account since November 29, 2004, leaving a balance due (as of the date of 
the Complaint) of$24,567.91. R Vol. 3, pp. 574-76 (Ryning Aff., ~~ 3-5, 8-10). Further, in 
response to discovery, Carroll admits that Citibank honored her balance transfer requests by 
paying the requested balances. R Vol. 3, pp. 523-24 (responses to RFA Nos. 47,.49, 51). 
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Moreover, an award of attorney fees may be granted under LC. § 12-121 and I.AR. 41 on 
appeal to the prevailing party. Such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the 
abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. Excel Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 769 P.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1989). An 
award of attorney fees will be made if the law is well settled and the appellant has made no 
substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the law, or - - on review of discretionary 
decisions - - no cogent challenge is presented with regard to the trial judge's exercise of 
discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 797 P.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1990); e.g., Twin Falls County 
v. Coates, 139 ldaho 442, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003) ("attorney fees will be awarded against a 
prose appellant who brought or pursued the appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation"). 
ln this case, the Card Agreement provides for the award of attorney fees and costs to the 
extent necessary for Citibank to retain counsel to collect on the Account. R Vol. 3, p. 622 
(at p: 7, under the heading, "Collection Costs"). Specifically, the Card Agreement provides, "If 
we refer collection of your account to a lawyer who is not our salaried employee, you will have 
to pay our attorney's fee plus court costs or any other fees, to the extent permitted by law. If we 
sue to collect and you win, we will pay your reasonable legal fees and court costs." Id Citibank 
was required to retain counsel to collect on Appellant's Account. Idaho law provides that in a 
civil action to recover on an open account or account stated, in any commercial transaction, the 
prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee. LC. § 12-120(3). Citibank was 
awarded summary judgment on its collection action and a dismissal of the Defendant's 
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counterclaims. Citibank should be determin<:d to be the prevailing party in this case and a warded 
its attorney fees and costs on appeaL 
Furthermore, Appellant's appeal is frivolous and presents no meaningful issue on a 
question of law. The record contains abundant evidence supporting the judgment entered in 
favor of Citibank and therefore Citibank is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-121 and/or§ 12-123. 
Citibank respectfully requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the 
Contract, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and Idaho Code§ 12-121, § 12-123, the amount to be 
determined by l.A.R 4l(d). 
lV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Citibank respectfully requests that this Court affirm both the 
District Court's December 10, 2007 Order granting Summary Judgment and the District Court's 
April 3, 2008 Judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THISqM day of October, 2008. 
STROOCK & STROOCK & LA VAN LLP 
Attomo:ys for Plaintiff/Respondent Citibank (South 
Dakota), N.A., 
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